TSMV KAITAWA

The last voyage of the T.S.M.V. Kaitawa

At 1.15 PM on the 21st of May 1966 the Kaitawa cleared the port of Westport on the west coast of New Zealand's South Island with a cargo of 2957 tons of coal. She was bound for the cement works at Portland near Whangarei via the North Cape, a voyage she would have completed many times since she arrived in New Zealand from her Scottish builders in 1949.

The original ETA of the Kaitawa at Portland was 4am on the 24th of May. This was changed on May 23rd to noon on the 24th and then later to 3 PM on the 24th. These changes were probably due to deteriorating weather conditions.

The last hours of the Kaitawa and her crew.

On the night the Kaitawa wrecked the weather was deteriorating. Winds were from the Westerly quarter at 35 knots, seas very rough with a heavy swell; visibility was bad in frequent rainsqualls.

The weather at Cape Reinga at 2100 hours that night was reported to be: Wind direction from 270 degrees, speed 35 knots, visibility up to 15 miles subject to rain squalls.

At 8pm N.Z. time, the Kaitawa was seen by the south bound vessel "Cape Horn" in a position about 5 miles west of the northern end of the Pandora bank. The officer of the watch on ”Cape Horn” reported that at about 8pm the Kaitawa had started to alter her course to clear Cape Reinga.

Because there were no survivors from the Kaitawa probably the last person to see her was the officer of the watch on Cape Horn. So what occurred after that time is just theory.

The Position she gave in the distress message put her on the western edge of the Bank. The official inquiry into the sinking dismissed the position given in the MAYDAY as being incorrect.

There is a quote from the report of the official inquiry.

"The position given by the Kaitawa in the distress message would place her on the western edge of Pandora Bank. At this point it is sufficient to say that it is clear the Kaitawa was certainly not in that position. Her exact position cannot be fixed with precision but it has been calculated by Captain Milroy as at a point from which Cape Reinga was bearing 080 degrees True to 085 degrees True, and was distant 7 to 10 nautical miles. At this time the weather was deteriorating and a heavy sea was running".

I strongly disagree with that opinion regarding the position. I cannot think of any reason why at the time the Kaitawa sent the MAYDAY message they would not have been aware of the correct bearing to Cape Reinga light. These were profession seamen of long experience they would have known how to take an accurate bearing of a light.  However I am prepared to believe until that time they may not have been aware just how close was the Pandora bank. In other words they knew the bearing of the light but not the distance off.

For these reasons.

1.      The Kaitawa was a ship with no radar or echo sounder.

2.      The weather was very bad.

3.      It was night and visibility was poor.

4.      They would have been distracted by the stressful situation.

5.      The ship was listing which may have made getting a decent visual bearing difficult.

6.      In that general area the angle between the two lights the one on Cape Maria Van Dieman and the other on Cape Reinga is not sufficiently different to give an accurate position fix.

Had the Kaitawa been fitted with radar it would have been a simple matter to read off the distance.

Given the above mentioned factors it is quite possible they believed they were much further out to sea than they actually were.

If the Kaitawa was where Captain Milroy, of the official inquiry suggested then they could have seen both Cape Maria van Dieman light and Cape Reinga light. Which would have given them a good position fix!

North Cape Chart of 1972 showing incident positions

The problem for the official inquiry

The official inquiry cannot reconcile the MAYDAY message position with the last known position of the Kaitawa as reported by the officer on Cape Horn.

In a letter dated 20^th July 1966 addressed to Captain H. Ruegg of the government’s Marine Department, Captain Milroy writes, “…it does not seem possible for the “Kaitawa” to have reached the Pandora Bank position at 2100 without actually steaming there.”

 The inquiry assumes that the Kaitawa continued north from her position at 8pm as reported by the vessel "Cape Horn".

I agree, because the officer of the watch on the "Cape Horn" said she had appeared to alter course just after 8pm to clear Cape Reinga.

Captain Milroy of the inquiry seemed determined to make up a theory to prove the Kaitawa was not lost because she hit the Pandora Bank.

Another point of interest is in a letter to Captain Milroy from Captain Ruegg in which Captain Ruegg refers to a report that an airforce flying boat sighted wreckage at 1125 the morning following the accident. Quote:” This leads to the conjecture that perhaps the casualty could have occurred on the Bank and the wreckage drifted afterwards.”

Captain Milroy appeared to be resolute in his belief that Kaitawa did not wreck because she hit the bank.

The facts

As I see it, there are only two facts about the Kaitawa's position in the hours prior to her sinking.

These are:

1.      She was 5 miles west of the northern end of the Pandora Bank at 2000.

2.      At 2100 she was close to the bank where Cape Reinga light was bearing 035 degrees True.

The inquiry realised that some serious situation occurred with the Kaitawa sometime between 2000 and 2100 hours, but could not imagine how she might have recovered from that and finished up wrecking on the west edge of Pandora bank a relatively short time later.

Captain Milroy was correct in his letter when writing, “it does not seem possible for the “Kaitawa” to have reached the Pandora Bank position at 2100 without actually steaming there.”

I believe she did steam there.

After the wreck

The wreck of the Kaitawa was fixed on June 8th 1966 at a position 246 degrees True and 4.77 miles from Cape Reinga light at about 6.5 miles north of where I believe she hit the bank. The superstructure was gone all the hatch covers were missing as was the cargo of coal. At 11.25 am on the 24th May the day following the disaster wreckage was sighted by an airforce “Sunderland” flying boat in the water about 4 miles north of the position where I believe she hit the bank. The strong tides in the area flow north and south, at  about 1am on the 24th May the tide began to flow north which could have carried the wreck to the point where she eventually sank. On the turn of the tide to the south once more the tide may have carried the floating wreckage back south to where it was spotted at 11.25am.

 At 2350 hours on the 23rd the vessel Cape Horn which had returned from the south to search for the Kaitawa sighted a Red flare on a bearing of 23 degrees True, distance 5 to 10 nautical miles. I have been unable to find out what position the Cape Horn was in when she sighted this flare. The Cape Horn could not close to search for the origin of the flare because that would have brought her into the dangerous area of the Pandora Bank. The bad weather conditions then forced the Cape Horn to "hove to" from Midnight until daybreak. Though they kept up a radar search of the sea area they saw nothing of the Kaitawa the sea clutter being very severe.

There were no survivors of the 29crew of the Kaitawa and only one body was recovered that of John Wright. Wreckage of one of the ships liferafts was later recovered, this showed evidence of having been inflated and that an emergency pack had been opened. Only 18 of the 32 lifejackets onboard the Kaitawa were recovered. Much of the wreckage was found in a relatively small area of the coast. So if the lifejackets did float off there should have been a good chance of them coming ashore here. Which could mean that 11 of the crew remained trapped inside the hull. In that case whatever happened occurred very fast and with little warning. This may have been the sudden realisation of the close proximity of the Pandora bank, just minutes prior to going onto the bank. Evidence for this being the change within 1 minute from an Urgency radio call to a Distress call and message and the abrupt loss of radio communication.

It seems strange that 18 lifejackets were recovered but only one body. Though I have attended many lifeboat drills and seen crew arrive at their muster stations carrying their lifejackets, and lifejackets put on incorrectly.

 It seems likely that at least some crew managed to abandon ship probably in the two liferafts, but the chances of a liferaft or lifeboat surviving the Pandora bank that night would be very small indeed.

 Conclusions

The loss of the Kaitawa was a tragedy. So many lives lost and even more lives disrupted or ruined. I don’t think any one person could be blamed for what happened. The sea can be tough and cruel at times. Certainly anyone who has worked on those old under powered and under equipped colliers will feel great sympathy for those lost that night. But understand these things can happen at sea, any time anywhere.

It is easy to say, if the Master of the Kaitawa had use of radar, an echo sounder and a decent chart to help him things could have been different. Maybe if the Kaitawa had more powerful engines, more freeboard and hatches that didn’t leak she might have made port safely. If she had not been in that part of the sea at that time and steering that course at that speed in waves of that size she would not have broached. But accidents are a series of events and conditions that accumulate, and then happen. Usually no one sees them coming and when some one does it is too late to change things, the point of no return has passed. Perhaps the point of no return in this situation was when the officer of the watch on Cape Horn saw Kaitawa change course to 035 true to clear Cape Reinga.

 From Ingrams book NZ shipwrecks

KAITAWA, motor vessel: The collier was on a passage from Westport to Portland, Whangarei, when, on the night of May 23, 1966, disaster overtook the vessel. The night was very dark, with frequent rain squalls. The sea was very rough, with a heavy swell and the wind from a westerly quarter was blowing at 35 knots. Since not one of her complement of 29 survived, the circumstances leading up to the loss of the ship will never be known and can only be conjectured.

Loaded with 2,957 tons of coal, the Kaitawa sailed from Westport at 10.45 p.m. on May 20 but returned next day to a point outside the bar. The Second Officer, Mr. R. P. Oakton, who had taken ill, was landed and his replacement, Mr. M. G. Jenkins, was embarked, the transfer being effected by the Westport tug. The vessel resumed her voyage at 1.13 p.m. on May 21 and proceeded northward.

On May 23 a radio telegram was sent from the collier, changing her estimated time of arrival from 4 a.m. on May 24 to noon and later another telegram was sent, putting back her time of arrival to 3 p.m. These changes in the ship's estimated time of arrival were probably due to deteriorating sea and weather conditions.

At 8 p.m. on May 23 the freighter Cape Horn, bound from Ocean Island to Lyttelton, passed the Kaitawa which was then about five miles west of the northern extremity of the Pandora Bank and about 12 to 13 miles from Cape Reinga. Approximately one hour later, at 8.59 p.m., Auckland Radio received by radio telephone a PAN message (an emergency signal denoting urgency but not imminent danger) from the Kaitawa. The ship's radio operator identified himself and then repeated the word PAN nine times, in three groups of three. This was followed by the ship's call sign "from Kaitawa ZMVC", repeated three times. Then, after a slight pause and at exactly 9 p.m., he sent a MAYDAY signal (which denotes imminent danger), followed by the message "Position - words missed - 10 miles Cape Reinga bearing 035 - word missed - 30 degrees. Requiring immediate assistance." The way the distress signal changed in urgency suggests that the Kaitawa's situation had suddenly worsened after the radio operator had began to send it. Auckland Radio requested a repeat of the vessel's position but Adelaide Radio then came on the air and as a result contact was lost. Further attempts to establish communication with the stricken vessel proved unavailing.
(In its report the Court of Inquiry states: "The position given by the Kaitawa in the distress message would place her on the western edge of Pandora Bank. At this point it is sufficient to say that it is clear the Kaitawa was certainly not in that position. Her exact position cannot be fixed with precision but it has been calculated by Captain Milroy as at a point from which Cape Reinga was bearing 080 degrees True to 085 degrees True, and was distant seven to 10 nautical miles. At this time the weather was deteriorating and a heavy sea was running.")

On receipt of the collier's MAYDAY call, the Auckland Coordination Centre was advised and air, sea and land searches were organised without delay. The Cape Horn, the only vessel in the area, received a relay of the signal at 9.18 p.m. The freighter, which was about 15 miles to the south, put back and retraced her former course to the position indicated in the Kaitawa's MAYDAY call, on the western side of the Pandora Bank. At 11.50 p.m. a red flare was sighted from the bridge of the Cape Horn, bearing 23 degrees T. and distant anything between five and 10 miles. The freighter continued on her northerly course as an approach towards the position where the flare had been sighted would have brought the ship into dangerous proximity of the Pandora Bank. A steady deterioration in the sea and weather conditions caused the Cape Horn to be hove-to from just after midnight until daylight. Meanwhile a constant radar scan was maintained, but the sea clutter was extremely bad, particularly on Pandora Bank, and the radar revealed nothing.

At first light on May 24 an extensive and sustained air, sea and ground search began and was continued on a full scale for the next six days. It was then scaled down to a sea and land search. Fourteen vessels, eight aircraft and land parties (in vehicles, on horseback and on foot) participated in the search which covered an area of 66,000 square miles. At 11.25 a.m. an R.N.Z.A.F. Sunderland aircraft sighted an oil slick about a mile north of Pandora Bank, and wreckage drifting towards the coast. Ground parties were directed to Twilight Bay and by 3.15 p.m. the wreckage had been positively identified as coming from the Kaitawa.
During the period of the search wreckage came ashore from the North Cape to Ahipara, on the southern extremity of Ninety Mile Beach. Most of the wreckage was found in Twilight Bay, south of Cape Maria van Diemen. The wreckage included several doors from the ship's superstructure; several lifebuoys, still clearly marked with the ship's name; 18 of the 32 lifejackets known to be on board, some of which showed indications that they may have been used; parts of a liferaft, with evidence that it had been inflated and occupied by someone who had opened the emergency pack which contained two parachute flares; and buoyancy tanks from the Kaitawa's two lifeboats and wreckage from one of them.

These various items of wreckage were to play a significant part in a reconstruction of what could have possibly have occurred at the time of and subsequent to the disaster.

On the afternoon of May 29 a body was seen floating in the sea off Te Waiawa Bay, but because of adverse sea and weather conditions was not recovered until next morning. It was later identified as that of John Easton Wright, a motorman on board the Kaitawa.

An oil slick reported by the tug Parahaki gave an indication as to where the wreck could be located. At 4.15 p.m. on June 8 H.M.N.Z.S. Tui, using an underwater television camera, located the Kaitawa at a point 246° 20', 4.77 nautical miles from Cape Reinga light. The wreck lay at a depth of about 24 fathoms, completely upside down, with the starboard side sitting flush with the sea bottom and the port side resting hard against an outcrop of rock. The superstructure was completely gone, having either been torn off while the vessel was drifting capsized or crushed into the hull as she settled on the sand and rock bottom.
A Navy diving team, commanded by Lieutenant N. Merrick, R.N., under extremely difficult conditions made two successful dives - to inspect the wreck. They found the hull holed and dented on the bottom of the port side, one dent being 80 feet long and six inches deep. As far as could be seen, all the hatch covers were missing and there was no sign of the cargo of coal, nor was any found in the vicinity of the wreck.

At the inquiry into the loss of the vessel, the Court found: "It is impossible to arrive at what happened to the Kaitawa on any basis of certainty. There was no survivor and no message was received from the ship which would explain the nature of the crisis which suddenly overtook the vessel and caused her to founder. The Court can only do its best to arrive at an acceptable theory which is of necessity based on inferences, probabilities and assumptions."
Further in its report, the Court states: "It appears that first a position arose in which the Master considered he should give a PAN message so that he was not then facing imminent danger. Then some other factor entered causing the message to be changed to a MAYDAY message; finally, almost immediately thereafter for some reason or other all contact with Kaitawa ceased. We must therefore look for (i) A reason for the PAN message. (ii) A reason for the change to a MAYDAY message. (iii) A reason for the sudden silence which followed.

"The reason for the PAN message can only be conjectured. It could possibly have been a loss of power from one engine or a leakage of water into the holds through the hatches while the vessel was shipping heavy seas."
Captain E. Milroy, Nautical Surveyor, who had been appointed by the Marine Department to assemble evidence for the inquiry, had made a thorough examination of all wreckage found. In addition, he had made a close study of information furnished by Lieutenant Commander G. B. W. Johnson, R.N.Z.N., concerning times and directions of tides and rates of drift. As a result, Captain Milroy was able to put forward what the Court considered to be the most acceptable theory of what occurred after the PAN message.

Captain Milroy's theory as to what happened next is; that while the Kaitawa was labouring in the trough of the sea, she was swept by a great wave or waves which burst in a teak door on the port side leading to
the crew's accommodation. Through the doorway
tons of water entered the accommodation and could
have caused a sudden, marked list to port. Because
of static interference or fading, several words in the
MAYDAY message were missed by Auckland
Radio, including one word preceding "30 degrees".

Captain Milroy concluded that the only appropriate word was "List" - list 30 degrees. The Court accepted this view and was of the opinion that if at that point a list of that magnitude developed, the Master would be justified in sending a MAYDAY message without further delay.

As the vessel rolled heavily with that list she would become more vulnerable to seas on her port beam or quarter. Wreckage recovered included teak woodwork from the bridge structure and it was clear that these fittings had been torn from their places by a tremendous force operating from the port side of the ship. This is consistent with the Kaitawa being swept by seas which poured through and shattered the woodwork of the superstructure. From the fact that 18 lifejackets were found out of a total of 32 known to be on board, the majority of which would be stowed below deck in the crew's accommodation, it was possible that at that point the crew would be mustering. It was likely that those on the bridge and others of the crew who were attempting to muster would be swept overboard by these seas. This would explain the sudden silence.

It would follow that from that point the Kaitawa, listing heavily to port, was out of human control and that thereafter she merely drifted. At some point water from the sea would pour into the engine room and all power would be lost.

Accepting the 9 p.m. position calculated by Captain Milroy and his theory of what occurred up to that time, Lieutenant Commander Johnson worked out the likely line of drift assuming the Kaitawa to be unmanned and drifting. He made allowance for the direction and force of tidal flow and the effects of sea and wind. Commander Johnson charted courses assuming rate of drift at one knot, two knots and three knots, but in his opinion a rate between one and two knots would be most probable. The significant point was no matter which of the rates of drift be adopted, the vessel might well cross the line of 23 degrees T. from the Cape Horn at about 11.50 p.m. This suggested that the red flare was fired either from the Kaitawa itself (which seemed unlikely) or from the liferaft which was still in company with the Kaitawa.

After the tide changed, it was calculated that irrespective of the rate of drift adopted, the Kaitawa would drift on to the Pandora Bank some time after midnight. In the state of wind and weather this was an area of wild turbulence. It seems likely that in that event the vessel, already listing heavily to port, would strike the bank in such a way as to account for the long indentation on the port side of the bottom of the hull later found by the diving party. At that point or soon afterwards, the Kaitawa probably capsized. She would lose her hatch-covers and her cargo, but just where the coal cargo was lost it is not possible to say. Having capsized, the Kaitawa would still have some residual buoyancy from air trapped inside the hull so it was not likely she would sink. Commander Johnson calculated that after drifting south, when the tide changed at 1 a.m. on May 24, the Kaitawa, still capsized, drifted northward to a point about five and a-half miles W.S.W. of Cape Reinga light where, having lost all buoyancy, she plummeted with considerable force to the seabed.

The Kaitawa carried two liferafts and portions from at least one of them were found on the beach. Captain Milroy was able to demonstrate most convincingly that somebody had been in the liferaft. To the Court it seemed probable that Motorman Wright was in the raft and it seemed a tenable theory that the raft drifted with the Kaitawa until after she capsized and the raft broke away or was cut adrift after the ship had struck on Pandora Bank. It was therefore possible that the flare seen from the Cape Horn was fired from the liferaft which at that time was attached to the Kaitawa.

The finding of the Court was that the T.S.M.V. Kaitawa was lost as a result of being overwhelmed by the sea at a point from which Cape Reinga was on a bearing of 080 degrees T. to 085 degrees T. and distant 7 to 10 NM at about 2100 hours on May 23, 1966. Thereafter the vessel drifted out of control until the early hours of May 24, 1966, when at some time before daylight, she, having capsized, sank to the seabed, coming to rest at a point 246° 20', 4.77 miles from Cape Reinga.
The Kaitawa, No. 173,888, was a twin-screw motor vessel of 2,485 tons gross and 1,317 tons net register, built at Leith, Scotland, in 1949 by Henry Robb, Ltd. Her dimensions were: length 293.75 ft., beam 43.2 ft., depth 17.33 ft. Her two engines were of 1,450 IHP. She was owned by the Union Steam Ship Company of New Zealand, Ltd. and was commanded by Captain G. R. Sherlock, an experienced master mariner who had joined the company in 1949, and had made 33 West Coast round trips as master of colliers.

The other members of the crew were: Chief Officer, Mr. R. C. C. McEwen; Second Officer, Mr. M. G. Jenkins; Radio Officer, Mr. P. D. Mowat; Chief Engineer, Mr. O. P. Horrobin; Second Engineer, Mr. G. Emmerson; Third Engineer, Mr. J. W. Fox; Fourth Engineer, Mr. R. Williams; Electrician, Mr. W. Underwood; Leading A.B. (Bosun), Mr. R. I. Hill; A.Bs, Messrs. B. Oliver, A. Meekin, T. F. Walker, G. G. Casey, J. Wilson, V. Clarkson; O.S. (Acting A.B.), Mr. K. Sheldon; O.S., Mr. C. Pulekula; Deck Boy, Mr. I. A. Hayward;Crew Orderly, Mr. T. W. Byrne; Motormen, Messrs. J. E. Wright, J. McLean, J. McLeary, C. Fletcher; Chief Steward, Mr. J. Pickles; Assistant Stewards, Messrs. G. Jones, J. O'Connell; Chief Cook, Mr. B. W. E. Smith; Assistant Cook, Mr. D. Collett. (See plate 124.)

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